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RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL IN SOUTH CAROLINA
MARGARET G. STEWART*
The concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel enforce
a corollary of the common law's requirement that every individ-
ual be given his or her day in court before being either barred from
asserting a claim or found liable to another: every individual is
entitled to only one such day in court because of the interest of
society (as well as that of the adversary party) in an end to litiga-
tion.' These two concepts are traditionally distinguished by refer-
ence to the cause of action attempted to be brought in the second
suit. If such cause of action is the same as that involved in the
first suit and if the first suit was resolved by a valid and personal
final judgment on the merits of the cause of action, that judgment
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of South Carolina, School of Law. B.A.,
Kalamazoo College, 1968; J.D., Northwestern University, 1971.
1. Hart v. Bates, 17 S.C. 35, 40 (1882). See also Watson v. Goldsmith, 205 S.C. 215,
221-22, 31 S.E.2d 317, 319-20 (1944), in which the court apparently distinguishes res
judicata, which it agrees rests upon such common law principles, from estoppel, which is
the result of equitable considerations. However, a reading of the holding in that case, as
well as an understanding of South Carolina's use of the term res judicata, indicates that
the estoppel of which the court speaks is not that referred to herein as collateral estoppel.
See notes 86-89 and accompanying text infra.
At least one case, Farmer v. Miller, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 480 (1852), indicated a second
concern underlying res judicata: were the second suit not barred, it might result in a
decision contrary to the first judgment. However, since a second suit would not be an
appellate proceeding, the first judgment would continue to stand in conflict with the
second. "Such results can not be allowed: and hence, therefore, the plaintiff ought to be
concluded [by the first judgment]." Id. at 484. See also Greenwood Drug Co. v. Bromonia
Co., 81 S.C. 516, 520, 62 S.E. 840, 842 (1908).
To some extent, the same policies also underlie the distinct South Carolina doctrine
of election of remedies. The courts of the state have consistently distinguished the two
theories, holding that if the same facts would have supported two causes of action, suit
on the second after a judgment on the first is barred because the plaintiff has elected his
remedy, not because of any operation of res judicata. If, however, the facts failed to
support the first cause of action but would support the second, the plaintiff is barred
neither by res judicata (see note 71 and accompanying text infra) nor by election of
remedies. Lancaster v. Smithco, Inc., 241 S.C. 451, 128 S.E.2d 915 (1962); Lafitte v.
Tucker, 216 S.C. 201, 57 S.E.2d 255 (1950). Cases usually make a distinction between res
judicata and the law of the case, which is a refusal to permit parties to argue the same
point twice in the same case. This is a clearer distinction since the concept of res judicata,
however defined, begins with the assumption of two consecutive suits. But see Montgo-
mery v. Robinson, 93 S.C. 247, 76 S.E. 188 (1912). This article will not deal with election
of remedies or the law of the case but will concern itself with res judicata and collateral
estoppel.
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constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It concludes
the parties and their privies not only as to matters litigated in the
first suit but also as to matters which might have been litigated
therein. The judgment is said to be res judicata. On the other
hand, if the second cause of action is different from the first, the
first judgment is binding only as to those matters actually and
necessarily litigated and determined in the first suit. It collater-
ally estops parties or their privies2 from again disputing the same
fact.3 Unless otherwise indicated in the text, this article will
utilize these traditional definitions.
4
The most frequently cited formulation of the doctrines in
South Carolina is stated in the nineteenth century case of Hart
v. Bates:5 "[A]t least three things are necessary: the parties
must be the same, or their privies; the subject-matter must be the
same, and the precise point must have been ruled."6 By 1922 the
court had come to realize the inadequacy of this third require-
ment and amplified it in Johnston-Crews Co. v. Folk:
7
If the identity of the parties and the identity of the causes of
action have been established, the former adjudication is conclu-
sive, not only of the precise issues raised and determined, but
such as might have been raised affecting the main issue. If the
identity of the parties has been established, but the identity of
the causes of action has not, any issue appearing upon the record
or by extrinsic evidence to have been adjudicated in the former
suit is conclusive upon the parties in a subsequent action. If the
identity of the parties has been established but the identity of
the causes of action has not, the former judgment is conclusive
only as to those issues actually determined; that is, the rule of
2. The extent to which persons other than parties or their privies may utilize the
doctrine of collateral estoppel is discussed at notes 119-33 and accompanying text infra.
3. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
4. Other definitions of res judicata are clearly possible. The term is sometimes used,
as in South Carolina and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (Tent. Draft Nos. 1,
1973, and 2, 1975) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (1) and RESTATEMENT (2)] to refer
to both res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Restatement also, however, separates the
concept into three parts: merger and bar, direct estoppel, and collateral estoppel. Certain
texts refer to claim preclusion and issue preclusion. As long as each concept is understood
and differentiated from the other, it seems to make little difference which term is used,
provided the usage is consistent.
5. 17 S.C. 35 (1882). See also Smith v. Smith, 55 S.C. 507, 510, 33 S.E. 583, 584
(1899).
6. Hart v. Bates, 17 S.C. 35, 40 (1882).
7. 118 S.C. 470, 111 S.E. 15 (1921).
[Vol. 28
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conclusiveness as to matters which might have been litigated
has no application.'
Thus, by introducing in the Johnston-Crews case the concept of
a cause of action and its possibly broader preclusionary impact
as only one example of the prohibition against relitigating the
same issue, South Carolina has developed the doctrine of res
judicata as a corollary to the doctrine of collateral estoppel and
has termed both the basic rule and its subsidiary res judicata. To
determine the precise effect of a former judgment in a subsequent
suit, it is necessary to determine first in each case which doctrine
is being used. The analysis which follows, therefore, is divided
into two major parts according to the traditional definitions and
is concentrated in each instance on the primary difficulties of the
doctrine.
I. RES JUDIcATA9
A. The Scope of a Cause of Action
1. The Plaintiff's Viewpoint
Essential to a decision that one suit in its entirety is barred
by a judgment in a former suit is a determination that both suits
rest upon the same cause of action. The formulation of South
Carolina's doctrine unfortunately adds the issue of whether the
cause of action expressed by a complaint is the same thing as the
8. Id. at 482, 111 S.E. at 18; accord, Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 380 F. Supp. 197,
199 (D.S.C. 1973).
9. In addition to the requirements for applying res judicata discussed below, it is also
necessary that thd judgment have been rendered by a competent court. The distinction
between courts of law and equity, prior to their merger, was irrelevant in those cases where
their subject matter jurisdiction was coextensive, see, e.g., Henderson v. Mitchell, 8 S.C.
Eq. (Bail. Eq.) 113 (1830), but the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings, in
the context of res judicata, is not. A criminal judgment will not support a plea of res
judicata in a civil action. Frierson v. Jenkins, 72 S.C. 341, 51 S.E. 862 (1905). If that
judgment is admissible in the civil suit because it is based upon an admission (plea) of
guilt by defendant, it is of evidentiary value only and is not conclusive. Globe & Rutgers
Fire Ins. Co. v. Foil, 189 S.C. 91, 200 S.E. 97 (1938). Whether or not bodies not designated
as courts may render judgments binding on the parties in a subsequent suit depends upon
the nature of the body and the cause of action involved. Compare Derrick v. Gaston School
Dist., 172 S.C. 472, 174 S.E. 431 (1934) (suit by plaintiff before the Board of Education
determining his right to teach in the district conclusive in his subsequent suit for back
pay) with County of Richland v. Miller, 16 S.C. 244 (1879) (decision by the Board of
Commissioners expressed in audit not conclusive of plaintiff's suit to recover funds distrib-
uted to defendant pursuant to audit). See also McKee v. Town-Council of Anderson, 24
S.C.L. (Rice) 24, 26 (1838).
1977] 453
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subject matter of a suit to the inevitable difficulty of defining a
cause of action. Courts which have addressed the question di-
rectly agree that the phrases refer to separate concepts: a single
cause of action can involve only a single subject matter, but nu-
merous causes of action may spring from that one subject mat-
ter.'" Nonetheless, a decision that res judicata bars a second suit
frequently begins with a discussion of the identity of the causes
of action and ends with a holding which apparently rests on the
identity of the subject matter involved." As long as the first de-
termination is made, the second is irrelevant. Difficulties arise
when that first determination is ignored, and the line between res
judicata and collateral estoppel is consequently blurred.
Cases in South Carolina have presented two primary tests for
determining the identity of causes of action in the context of res
judicata: 1) would the same evidence support both suits; and/or
2) does each suit involve the same primary right and primary
duty.
The first evidentiary test apparently stems from the South
Carolina Supreme Court's more general procedural definition of
a cause of action as that group of factual elements which gives
rise to a legal right to relief.'" If the same evidence would be
necessary in both suits, the same elements would be necessary in
10. See Chick Spring Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 178 S.C. 415, 424-25, 183
S.E. 27, 31-32 (1935). See also Harth v. United Ins. Co. of America, 266 S.C. 1, 221 S.E.2d
102 (1975); Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S.C. 177, 185, 51 S.E.2d 622, 626 (1949); Whaley v.
Stevens, 21 S.C. 221 (1883). For example, where the plaintiff has once adjudicated his
right to continuing disability payments under an insurance contract and sues a second
time to recover unpaid installments due under the same contract after the first judgment,
his second suit involves a separate cause of action although the subject matter of both
suits is the same. See Dunlap v. Travelers Ins. Co., 223 S.C. 150, 74 S.E.2d 828 (1953).
11. For an example of this judicial reasoning, see Davis v. Town of West Greenville,
147 S.C. 448, 450-51, 145 S.E. 193, 194 (1928) (two class actions to enjoin the issuance of
bonds; the causes of action held to be the same; the second suit is barred because of
identity of parties and subject matter).
12. Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S.C. 177, 184, 51 S.E.2d 622, 626 (1949); Johnston-Crews
Co. v. Folk, 118 S.C. 470, 478, 111 S.E. 15, 17 (1922); Tillie v. Glens Falls Ins., 208 F.
Supp. 921 (W.D.S.C. 1962). At least one case, Norton v. Planters Fertilizer & Phosphate
Co., 206 S.C. 119, 33 S.E.2d 247 (1945), indicates that the identity of evidence may reflect
a broader identity than that of the elements of a cause of action. The court discussed not
only the material allegations but also the gravamen of each complaint and in their sub-
stantial similarity found reason to bar the second suit. Id. at 126, 33 S.E.2d at 429.
However, the court rested its final decision on a series of holdings paralleling the Hart
formulation, and thus the opinion cannot be read to broaden consciously the definition of
a cause of action in the context of res judicata to the federal rules' "claim upon which
relief may be granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 8. See notes 32-38 and accompanying text infra.
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both, and hence both rest upon the same cause. This connection
between evidence and causes of action is reflected in manifold
cases which hold that a second suit, differing from the first only
in the addition of evidence, is barred by res judicata.'3 Whether
that evidence speaks to an issue raised in the first suit" or to an
issue which, though not raised in that suit, should and could have
been determined there'5 is irrelevant. In either event the plaintiff
is concluded by the first judgment and is prevented from reliti-
gating the same claim in a more complete fashion. The only ex-
ception to this general rule involves extrinsic fraud discovered
after the first judgment. In circumstances where such fraud could
not have been reasonably discovered at the time of the first suit,,6
the second suit may raise the new issue and support it with new
evidence. This principle rests upon what the courts recognize as
a different cause of action.
The most recent South Carolina Supreme Court decision
which defines a cause of action within the context of res judicata,
13. See, e.g., Moseley v. Welch, 218 S.C. 242, 62 S.E.2d 313 (1950).
14. Clanton's Auto Auction Sales, Inc. v. Campbell, 230 S.C. 65, 75, 94 S.E.2d 172,
177 (1956) (additional evidence of plaintiff's ownership by assignment of destroyed vehicle
held insufficient to support second suit; note that the court reached its decision by consid-
ering the identity of parties and issues rather than the causes of action); Winthrop v.
Mullins, 211 S.C. 351, 355, 45 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1947) (additional evidence to support
changing sum allegedly owing to plaintiff insufficient to support second suit); Tate v.
Hunter, 22 S.C. Eq. (3 Strob. Eq.) 136 (1849) (additional evidence of prior payments made
to the defendant insufficient to support second suit); Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc., 269 F.
Supp. 214 (D.S.C. 1967) (additional allegations of fraudulent conduct involving a third
party insufficient to support second suit).
15. Taylor v. Taylor, 241 S.C. 462, 128 S.E.2d 910 (1962) (divorce decree concludes
plaintiff requesting alimony because of changed condition when no such caveat appears
in decree); Winthrop v. Mullins, 211 S.C. 351, 356, 45 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1947) (plaintiff's
claim for value of services pursuant to a contract for payment by will in second suit should
have been raised in first suit to enforce a contract to make a will and is barred by res
judicata); Nelson v. Parson, 187 S.C. 478, 198 S.E. 401 (1938) (claim against defendant
as assignee of an insurance policy barred by prior suit seeking to recover the same funds
against defendant as administrator); Barnes v. Cunningham, 30 S.C. Eq. (9 Rich. Eq.)
475 (1857) (evidence of wife's ownership of land claimed by husband's estate barred by
first suit in which wife failed to claim land in original partition of husband's estate).
Obviously if the issue raised by the second suit could not have been raised earlier because
of inconsistencies with the allegations in the first suit, the first judgment is no bar. The
same evidence would not have supported both positions and, furthermore, the causes of
action are distinct. Nelson v. Parson, 187 S.C. 478, 482, 198 S.E. 401,402 (1938); Johnston-
Crews Co. v. Folk, 118 S.C. 470, 477-78, 111 S.E. 15, 17 (1922).
16. Compare Hart v. Bates, 17 S.C. 35 (1882) with Prickett v. Duke Power Co., 49
F.R.D. 116 (D.S.C. 1970), af'd 429 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970). See also Henderson v.
Mitchell, 8 S.C. Eq. (Bail. Eq.) 113 (1830).
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Harth v. United Insurance Co. of America,17 initially utilizes the
second test, whether the series of actions there involved a single
primary right of the plaintiff and a single primary duty owed the
plaintiff by the defendant. By requiring that both the right and
the duty be the same before one cause of action rather than two
is found, the case is in accord with some older authority in the
state." However, there is at least some authority for the proposi-
tion that only the duty and its breach comprise the cause of
action.
In Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Department,"
the plaintiff first sued for water damage to his land allegedly
caused by the defendant's negligent construction of a culvert;
judgment was for the defendant. Subsequently the plaintiff de-
manded that the culvert be enlarged; it was not and, when water
once again overflowed the plaintiff's land, he sued for the resul-
tant damages, alleging that the defendant had negligently failed
to enlarge the culvert. Reversing a judgment for the defendant
based upon res judicata, the supreme court held that the cause
of action in each case alleged a separate legal wrong (permitting
the overflow) or the damage done by the overflow. The subject
matter was the negligent construction of the culvert in the first
suit and the negligent refusal to enlarge it in the second.2" Be-
cause both the cause of action and the subject matter of each suit
were different, res judicata was held to provide no bar to the
second suit. Apparently the court, beginning with the correct
statement that the cause of action is a thing separate from its
subject matter,2' in effect split the proper definition of a cause of
action to avoid reaching a contrary decision under the Johnston-
Crews formula. The subject matter of the actions is clearly identi-
cal; the court's understanding of the existence of two duties owed
to the plaintiff, one involving the original construction and the
other the maintenance of the culvert, provides a more accurate
17. Harth v. United Ins. Co. of America, 266 S.C. 1, 221 S.E.2d 102 (1975).
18. Davis v. Town of West Greenville, 147 S.C. 448, 450, 145 S.E. 193, 194 (1928);
Johnston-Crews Co. v. Folk, 118 S.C. 470, 478-80, 111 S.E. 15, 17 (1922).
19. 178 S.C. 415, 183 S.E. 27 (1935).
20. Id. at 425-26, 183 S.E. at 31. It should be noted that a dissent was filed based
upon an understanding of the plaintiff's first claim as one for permanent damages result-
ing from the negligent construction of a permanent structure. Thus arguably the second
suit was only an attempt to recover additional damages dependent upon the same cause
of action as the first and was barred by the judgment therein. See notes 22 & 24 and
accompanying text infra.
21. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 28
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rationale for the existence of two causes of action and the result
thus reached.
22
In order to justify the Chick Springs result under Harth's
more stringent definition of a cause of action, it is essential that
the duties of the defendant be distinct, since the mere fact of
additional alleged damages is clearly insufficient to support a
second suit. For example, only one cause of action accrues to a
plaintiff who has suffered both personal and property damage
because of a single negligent act of the defendant. An attempt to
recover each element of damage in a separate suit constitutes
splitting the cause of action.2 So too, a plaintiff must claim all
damages resulting from all breaches of a contract in one suit or
lose the right to recover for the unpled breaches.24 Of course, if
the second breach of duty occurred subsequent to the first suit,
the plaintiff may institute a second suit for the resultant damage.
The clearest example of this situation is a second suit for a second
installment due on a contract or a second payment on an insur-
ance policy, the right to which had not accrued at the time of the
first suit. A prior judgment for previous installments or payments
may well have collateral estoppel effect, but it does not bar the
second claim.2
Certain other fact situations which arise frequently have
been viewed by the courts as subject to individual rules defining
the scope of the plaintiff's cause of action. In fact, most are more
easily understood as specific examples of the general rule restated
22. At least part of the court's confusion may have stemmed from language in BLISS,
CODE PLEADING 214 (3d ed.), cited in Holcombe v. Garland & Denwiddie, Inc., 162 S.C.
379, 388, 160 S.E. 881, 884 (1931). There the approved definition of cause of action also
revolved around the alleged wrong or breach of duty without a clear statement that an
understanding of a wrong is dependent on a determination of a primary right in the
plaintiff. However, the subject matter was defined as the thing involved in the dispute,
e.g., the property or contract or, here, the land and the culvert.
23. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
24. Smith v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 201 S.C. 291, 308, 22 S.E.2d 885, 891-92
(1942). See also Allen v. Southern Ry., 218 S.C. 291, 295, 62 S.E.2d 507, 509-10 (1950);
Floyd v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 187 S.C. 344, 197 S.E. 385 (1938). Even if the
plaintiff in the second suit is requesting an entirely different remedy rather than merely
a differing amount of damages, no new cause of action is made out. Evans v. Creech, 187
S.C. 371, 378, 197 S.E. 365, 367-68 (1938).
25. Dunlap v. Travelers Ins. Co., 223 S.C. 150, 157-58, 74 S.E.2d 828, 831 (1953). See
also Martin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 189 S.C. 48, 200 S.E. 87 (1938); Bank of S.C. v.
Bridges, 45 S.C.L. (11 Rich.) 87 (1857). The same logic prevents utilization of res judicata
as a bar to subsequent litigation if the first judgment involved a verdict directed only at
one of two claims presented by the pleadings. On the second claim, the plaintiff has not
had his day in court. See Duren v. Kee, 41 S.C. 171, 19 S.E. 492 (1894).
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in Harth that both the primary right and duty must be identical
in order for res judicata to bar a second suit. For example, a
defendant may be sued separately for damages resulting from the
wrongful death of plaintiff's deceased and for injuries to the de-
ceased under a survival statute." The duty breached in both cases
may be the same but the rights are separate. Similarly, a suit for
damages resulting from personal injuries does not bar another
suit by the injured party's spouse21 or parent 28 for loss of services
or for medical care. Again, the rights of the plaintiff which were
breached by a single negligent act of the defendant are distinct.29
The South Carolina rule which prevents a plaintiff from suing
joint tort-feasors seriatim rests on the same logic: one primary
right was breached once; the fact that breach was allegedly the
result of joint activity does not multiply it. The state has by
legislation created one exception to this (or any other) definition
of res judicata, permitting a plaintiff to sue twice to recover pos-
session of real property.3' However, this is clearly an exception to,
26. Deaton v. Gay Trucking Co., 275 F. Supp. 750 (D.S.C. 1967); Peeples v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 115 S.C. 115, 104 S.E. 541 (1920).
27. Gillespie v. Ford, 225 S.C. 104, 112-13, 81 S.E.2d 44, 47-48 (1954) (wife's suit for
injuries presents different cause of action than does husband's claim for loss of consor-
tium). See also Priester v. Southern Ry., 151 S.C. 433, 436, 149 S.E. 226, 227 (1929); Arant
v. Stover, 307 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D.S.C. 1969).
28. Hall v. Waters, 132 S.C. 117, 128 S.E. 860 (1925). Of course, damages awarded
to a child for personal injuries bar a claim for the same damages by the parents. Kapus-
chinsky v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 1 (D.S.C. 1966).
29. Another example of separate rights breached by a single act of the defendant
giving rise to separate causes of action arises when a debt is secured by one or more bonds
or mortgages. A determination that the mortgage was not properly executed will not defeat
a claim made on the underlying, otherwise proved, debt. Wagener & Co. v. Kirven, 52
S.C. 25, 34, 29 S.E. 390, 393 (1898). Nor will a judgment on a guarantee preclude suit on
a bond. Meinhard, Greeff & Co. v. Brown, 199 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1952).
That these decisions rest upon the concept of multiple rights in the plaintiff is clearly
shown by Ayers v. Guess, 217 S.C. 233, 60 S.E.2d 315 (1950). There, the court permitted
the plaintiff to foreclose a real estate mortgage upon breach of a condition of bond which
it secured and also to foreclose a mortgage on personal property which secured the same
bond. The dissent maintained that the second suit was barred by the first since the
plaintiff had split one cause of action; the plaintiff had one right secured by multiple
instruments rather than a separate right deriving from each instrument as the majority
held. The position of the dissent, however, is best understood as a definition of the scope
of the cause of action which includes all claims arising out of one transaction. See notes
32-38 and accompanying text infra. It is difficult to justify the proposition that, if one
mortgage were found ineffective, the right of the plaintiff to foreclose the other would be
nonexistent.
30. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963); Camp
v. Petroleum Carrier Corp., 204 S.C. 133, 28 S.E.2d 683 (1944).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2402 (1962). The second suit may be brought only when the
8
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rather than a definition of, the scope of a cause of action and does
not affect any situation other than that directly subject to the
statute.
Finally, a few cases in South Carolina utilize a third defini-
tion of cause of action which is similar to the transactional defini-
tion of the Restatement.32  This approach, in addition to the
primary right-duty test discussed above, is reflected in Harth,
where the plaintiff had allegedly been fraudulently induced to
continue making premium payments after the underlying policy
had expired. An agent collected twelve such premiums and the
plaintiff brought twelve suits. The defendant moved to dismiss
the last eleven complaints and appealed the lower court's refusal
to do so. The supreme court agreed that the plaintiff had only one
cause of action and ordered the complaints consolidated.33 While
initially relying on the more traditional definition revolving
around primary rights and duties,34 the court nonetheless stated:
plaintiff is out of possession and has lost the first suit. Winn v. Grantham, 263 S.C. 368,
210 S.E.2d 602 (1974). The statute is inapplicable in all other situations. For example, if
A has been ousted of possession as a result of a suit by B, he may not sue B for possession
of the same realty; he is barred by res judicata. Ladd v. DuPre, 247 S.C. 328, 331, 147
S.E.2d 253, 255 (1966).
Cases which deal with the same exception under older authority and which define the
scope of the cause of action which may be brought twice include Farmer v. Miller, 9 S.C.L.
(5 Rich.) 480 (1852) (right to second suit lost when trespass to try title replaced ejectment);
accord, Thomas v. Geiger, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 528 (1820). Contra, Dyson v. Leek,
36 S.C.L. (5 Strob.) 141 (1850); Bradley v. McBride, 9 S.C. Eq. (Rich. Cas.) 202 (1832)
(suit for trespass to try title does not include ability to obtain the setting aside of a sale
and the refund of the purchase money); Coleman v. Parish, 12 S.C.L. (1 McC.) 264 (1821)
(trespass to try title includes both the older actions of ejectment and the recovery of mesne
profits); accord, Sumter v. Lehie, 6 S.C.L. (1 Tread.) 102 (1812).
32. RESTATEMENT (1), supra note 4, at § 61. Discussing the scope of a cause of action
within the context of what this article has termed res judicata, the section in pertinent
part states:
(1) [T]he claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series
of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction", and what groupings
constitute a "series", are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such
considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motiva-
tion, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as
a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.
33. The court refused to bar the last eleven claims for damages because, since the
first suit had as yet to be tried, the plaintiff had not had her day in court. The purpose of
the interlocutory appeal was to determine the number of her causes of action, not to bar
her from full relief. 266 S.C. at 7, 221 S.E.2d at 105.
34. See text accompanying notes 17 & 18 supra.
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Although [plaintiff] has a right to be free from fraud and each
of the agent's trips to collect [each premium] might contain all
the technical elements necessary to constitute a separate inva-
sion of [plaintiff's] right, when judicial relief is sought the
court must consider alleged wrongs in their factual environ-
ment, taking into consideration the totality of circumstances.
Nothing is served by allowing [plaintiff] to prosecute her ac-
tion piecemeal, harassing [defendant] and the courts by main-
taining twelve separate suits all identical except dates which
run consecutively. . ..
In support of its decision, the court cited Brice v. Glenn."
There the court, instead of finding a separate cause of action
arising from each wrongful act of the defendant, held that the
totality of the property lost through the series of breaches of duty
was the limit of the cause, and the defendant's motion to dismiss
for improper joinder therefore failed.37 Other earlier cases, al-
though failing to recognize or to state the implication of their
holdings, also point toward a transactional rather than right-duty
definition. 8 Such a departure from the state's general concern
35. 266 S.C. at 7, 221 S.E.2d at 105 (emphasis added). It should be noted that each
invasion of the plaintiff's right would be proved by different, though similar, evidence.
36. 165 S.C. 509, 164 S.E. 302 (1932).
37. In discussing Brice, the Harth court discussed its definition of subject matter. 266
S.C. at 6, 221 S.E.2d at 105. However, from the context of the decision and its use of the
Brice precedent, it is clear that the court's approval of a broad view was directed toward
the definition of a cause of action. Whether the courts in either Brice or Harth would have
been willing to use such a broad definition had the result been to bar the plaintiff from
recovery is uncertain. However, the court did not comment on this factor in reaching its
result, and it would not affect the logic of either opinion.
38. Greer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 105 S.C. 147, 89 S.E. 782 (1916). Defendant
allegedly failed to deliver a telegram to the plaintiff informing him of his father's death.
Plaintiff sued first for breach of a statutory duty and resultant damages from mental
anguish. His second suit for a breach of common law duty involving a willful failure to
deliver the telegram was barred.
The transaction is the same in every detail. . . . It was the duty of the plaintiff
to put in issue in [the first] suit every issuable matter which naturally and
directly arose out of that transaction. If the single transaction, the omission by
the defendant, involved the breach of a statute and at the same time a breach
of the common law, then for such breaches the defendant ought to be sued only
once.
Id. at 151, 89 S.E. at 783 (emphasis added).
Possibly the court was relying sub silentio on the idea that a cause of action arises
when the injury is done. While that rule, utilized in decisions involving statutes of limita-
tions, may well define the time a right to sue accrues, it does not speak directly to the
question of how many such rights accrue. Alternatively, the case can be explained on the
basis that the plaintiff elected his remedy in the first suit and hence may not sue again.
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with the elements of a cause of action would be dramatic and
cannot be confidently expected anytime in the near future. It
would, however, serve the policies underlying res judicata 3  and,
in the absence of a more clearly defined doctrine of collateral
estoppel, may be the simplest way to prevent relitigation of issues
already determined.
2. The Defendant's Viewpoint
Once it has been determined that two suits rest upon the
same cause of action, res judicata bars the pursuit of the second;
the plaintiff is said to have impermissibly split his cause of ac-
tion. 0 The primary corollary of the rule which affects the defen-
dant thus prohibits him from using in a second suit defenses
which were available to him but not used in the first suit. All
defenses must be pled or they are lost.41 For example, A sues B
on a promissory note; B defaults and judgment is entered for A.
Res judicata bars a suit by B against A to recover sums paid to
A under the note on the ground that the note was improperly
executed.42 Similarly, the foreclosure of a mortgage pursuant to a
default judgment for A against B prevents B from attempting to
set aside the resulting sale of the property alleging an invalid
However, the court clearly understood itself to be applying the doctrine of res judicata.
In any event, the right-duty analysis strictly applied would have surely allowed the second
suit, and the evidence to support a claim of willful withholding would certainly differ from
that necessary to sustain a claim of negligence. While the court treated the second suit as
involving the same telegram, apparently two telegrams were actually involved, a fact
which was obscured by the repetition in the second suit of the first complaint. The logic
of the opinion remains unaffected by the change in the facts. See also Washington v.
Western Auto Supply Co., 230 S.C. 424, 428, 96 S.E.2d 63, 65 (1957) (the state claim and
delivery statute contemplates "the settlement in one suit of all questions that might arise
out of the unlawful taking or detention of the property"); Watson v. Goldsmith, 205 S.C.
215, 223, 31 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1944); Rowand v. Fraser, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 325, 330 (1845)
(in determining whether a defendant, in the absence of any compulsory counterclaim rule,
may utilize facts which support a defense as the basis of a separate and independent claim
against the plaintiff, "if the matter of defence be connected with the plaintiff's cause of
action, by originating in the same transaction," the first judgment bars the second suit)
(emphasis added).
39. Of course, the adoption of any such broad definition of cause of action within the
context of res judicata assumes that, under other state procedural rules, litigation of the
entire controversy was possible in a single suit. If, because of rules regarding joinder of
claims, inconsistent theories, etc., such litigation is not initially permissible, the second
suit should not be barred. See RESTATEMENT (1), supra note 4, at § 61.2(c).
40. Melton v. Melton, 229 S.C. 85, 91 S.E.2d 873 (1956).
41. McLeod v. Sandy Island Corp., 264 S.C. 463, 466-67, 215 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1975);
Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S.C. 177, 189, 51 S.E.2d 622, 628 (1949).
42. Davis v. Murphy, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 560 (1846).
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foreclosure; any defense to the foreclosure should have been
raised in the first suit.43
Not only must the defendant raise or lose all his defenses, but
he must also support them to the best of his ability the first time
they are used. Just as the plaintiff may not create a new cause of
action by the addition of new evidence," so too a defendant may
not create a new defense by a similar method.
45
Facts which support a defense to one suit may also support
a claim for relief against the plaintiff therein. Obviously if the
defendant has presented those facts as a defense46 to the original
suit and lost, he may not relitigate the same facts in an indepen-
dent second suit; he is barred by res judicata.47 However, if either
the facts are not used as a defense to the first action or those facts
supported a successful defense to that action, the defendant's
ability to utilize the same facts as the basis of an independent
claim against the first plaintiff is less certain. Provided that the
facts not used as a defense to the first action actually support a
separate claim for relief, in the absence of any compulsory coun-
43. Antrum v. Hartsville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 228 S.C. 201, 89 S.E.2d 376 (1955). See
also Baitary v. Gahagan, 195 S.C. 520, 525, 12 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1940); Earle v. Earle, 33
S.C. 498, 504, 12 S.E. 164, 165 (1890); Rice v. Mahaffey, 9 S.C. 281, 282 (1878); Upson v.
Horn, 34 S.C.L. (3 Strob.) 108, 111 (1848). The court in Antrum stated that the applica-
tion of a bar to issues which might have been but were not litigated in a former action
rests upon a doctrine of estoppel rather than of res judicata. 228 S.C. at 209, 89 S.E.2d at
379-80. That statement stems, however, from the definition of the doctrine contained in
Hart v. Bates, 17 S.C. 35 (1882), and serves only to confuse the applicable law. When
compared to holdings that, if the causes of action are separate, parties are estopped from
relitigating only issues actually litigated in a former suit, its absurdity becomes apparent.
See notes 114 & 115 and accompanying text infra. The comment is understandable only
if South Carolina defines res judicata not as encompassing both res judicata and collateral
estoppel, but rather defines res judicata as collateral estoppel and collateral estoppel as
res judicata. Fortunately, no other case directly states such a position (but see similar
indications in Watson v. Goldsmith, 205 S.C. 215, 221, 31 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1944)) and the
all-encompassing usage of the term remains common.
44. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
45. Sharpe v. Huggins, 114 S.C. 40, 102 S.E. 788 (1920); Jones v. Weathersbee, 35
S.C.L. (4 Strob.) 50 (1849).
46. Watson v. Goldsmith, 205 S.C. 215, 223-24, 31 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1944); Greenwood
Drug Co. v. Bromonia Co., 81 S.C. 516, 521, 62 S.E. 840, 842 (1908).
47. Such a bar depends, of course, on the legal ability of the defendant in the first
suit to present the facts which constitute his defense as a request for affirmative relief. If
state law precludes a counterclaim under the facts involved, see Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v, Bass, 229 S.C. 607, 93 S.E.2d 912 (1956), if the amount claimed by the defendant
is in excess of the court's jurisdiction, see Brother Int'l Corp. v. Southeastern Sales Co.,
234 S.C. 573, 109 S.E.2d 444 (1959), or if the first court for any other reason refuses to
hear the defendant's claim, see Salinas & Co. v. Aultman & Co., 45 S.C. 283, 22 S.E. 889
(1895), a second suit based on the same facts is permitted.
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terclaim rule in the state,48 the initial defendant may institute a
separate suit subsequent to the first judgment.
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Kirven49 involved an ini-
tial suit on a note for the payment of goods sold and delivered.
Originally, the defendant's answer alleged want of consideration,
maintaining that the goods were defective, and it was accompa-
nied by a statement of damages caused to his property from the
use of those goods. A supplemental answer, accepted by the trial
court, deleted that defense; judgment was for the plaintiff. The
defendant then sued the plaintiff for damages suffered as a result
of his use of the goods sold to him by the plaintiff; a defense of
res judicata was denied. The United States Supreme Court found
the causes of action were separate and distinct. While Kirven
could not have sued to rescind the note for want of consideration
(a defense to the first suit), he could have maintained his claim
for unliquidated damages, which had not been raised or decided
in the former suit. Subsequent criticism of the case has been
devoted to a denial not of its legal premise but rather of its inter-
pretation of the separate nature of a claim for damages.5" Absent
such a separate cause of action, the defendant is clearly barred,
since he is in effect simply presenting an unused defense to the
first suit.51
If the defendant counterclaims against the plaintiff in the
first suit, relitigation of the cause of action underlying the coun-
terclaim is barred by the same basic principle which prevents a
plaintiff from suing twice on the same cause of action;52 the differ-
48. See H. LIGHTSEY, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA CODE PLEADING 199-205 (1976).
49. 215 U.S. 252 (1909), af'g 77 S.C. 493, 58 S.E. 424 (1907).
50. Greenwood Drug Co. v. Bromonia Co., 81 S.C. 516, 62 S.E. 840 (1908). The court
noted that this also formed the basis for the South Carolina Supreme Court's dissent in
Kirven:
The [dissenting] opinion . . . was based upon the view that where a judgment
goes against the defendant, and he afterwards sues plaintiff on a cross claim
which he might have presented in the first suit but did not, if the facts which
he must establish to authorize his recovery are inconsistent with or opposed to
the facts on which recovery was had in the first action, the former judgment
operates as an estoppel.
Id. at 521, 62 S.E. at 842 (emphasis in original). In other words, the policy which in part
underlies res judicata and which abhors two inconsistent judgments, see note 1 supra,
demands that a second claim based on facts contrary to those established by the first suit
be considered a part of that first cause of action. This position is in accord with that taken
by RESTATEMENT (1), supra note 4, at § 56.1.
51. Rowand v. Fraser, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 325, 330 (1845). See also notes 41-43 and
accompanying text supra.
52. Worley v. Greenwood Mfg. Co., 223 S.C. 249, 75 S.E.2d 298 (1953).
1977]
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ent title which the defendant bears in the first suit is irrelevant.
The similar result reached, however, by using facts first as a
successful defense and only then as the basis for independent
relief in a subsequent suit is not as easily explained.
Mitchell v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Columbia
5 3
held that such dual usage of the same facts "first as a shield, and
then as a sword"" constituted the splitting of a single cause of
action arising out of the existence of a single primary right and
duty and thus barred the second suit for damages. So Mitchell,
who had been sued on two notes held by the bank and had suc-
cessfully defended that action by proving the receipt by the bank
of proceeds from the sale of his crop in excess of the amount due
under the notes, was prevented from recovering that excess in a
subsequent suit. If the state had a compulsory counterclaim rule
similar to that of the federal system,55 or if a cause of action was
defined in transactional terms," the result would be clearly justi-
fiable and, for policy reasons such as those which support those
doctrines, might well be desirable. However, it is conceptually
difficult to maintain that a cause of action is exhausted so as to
prevent its second appearance when it is not the basis of any
attempt to obtain relief. So too is it difficult to accept that Mitch-
ell's primary right in both suits was the same. In fact, as a
defendant, he had the right not to be forced to pay that which
had already been paid; as a plaintiff, he certainly should have
had the right to recover that which the bank wrongfully withheld
from him." The effect of the holding is to enforce a compulsory
53. 165 S.C. 457, 164 S.E. 136 (1932).
54. Id. at 471, 164 S.E. at 140, citing O'Connor v. Varney, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 231
(1857).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) states in pertinent part:
Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
56. See notes 32-38 and accompanying text supra.
57. This becomes more obvious if the bank had held the proceeds from two crops,
one of which was sufficient to pay the notes. If Mitchell's proof that the bank held one
set of proceeds also necessarily involved proof that it held the other, it is inconceivable
that Mitchell would be precluded from recovering the second set of proceeds in a separate
suit.
The result of the Mitchell decision is contrary to the position taken both by
RESTATEMENT (1), supra note 4, at § 56.1, Comment d and by RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 58, Comment b (1943), which recognize that facts constituting a successful defense
might later form the basis of a claim for relief.
[Vol. 28
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counterclaim rule under the rubric of res judicata, an unfortunate
result given the lack of clarity in other applications of the doc-
trine.
B. Judgment on the Merits
Although not included in the Hart formulation of the doc-
trine of res judicata, and therefore not cited as a requirement for
its use in all subsequent cases, there is no doubt that South
Carolina will not invoke res judicata to prevent a second suit
unless the first judgment was rendered on the merits of the case.
For this purpose a judgment alone is sufficient; a verdict upon
which no judgment has been entered will not support the bar.5
Clearly, any judgment for the plaintiff is on the merits. 9 If,
however, judgment is entered for the defendant, it is necessary to
determine the reason behind the judgment before deciding
whether it may be given res judicata effect. State procedure does
provide for voluntary nonsuits of the plaintiff, 0 and such a dis-
missal does not bar a second suit on the same cause of action. In
addition, those judgments which dismiss the plaintiff's complaint
for want of jurisdiction,6 as premature,62 for improper joinder,63
58. Whetsell v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 188 S.C. 106, 114-15, 198 S.E. 153, 157
(1938); Durst v. Southern Ry., 161 S.C. 498, 508, 159 S.E. 844, 847 (1931). In Durst,
however, since all parties and the appellate court had treated the verdict as a judgment,
the court held that it was too late for the defendants to raise the objection.
59. See Norton v. Planters Fertilizer & Phosphate Co., 206 S.C. 119, 126, 33 S.E.2d
247, 249 (1945) (consent); McCown v. Muldrow, 91 S.C. 523, 540, 74 S.E. 386, 392 (1912)
(directed verdict); Weathersbee v. Weathersbee, 82 S.C. 4, 8, 62 S.E. 838, 839 (1908)
(consent).
60. Gulledge v. Young, 242 S.C. 287, 130 S.E.2d 695 (1963); Allen v. Southern Ry.,
218 S.C. 291, 297, 62 S.E.2d 507, 509 (1950); Kay v. Meadors, 216 S.C. 483, 486-87, 58
S.E.2d 893, 895 (1950); cf. RESTATEMENT (1), supra note 4, at § 48.1(1)(b) (voluntary
nonsuit without prejudice does not bar second suit).
61. Mack v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 65 (E.D.S.C. 1939); Turner v. Walker, 110
S.C. 155, 96 S.E. 481 (1918). Such a decision, however, does conclude the question of
jurisdiction as such; see Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D.S.C. 1967)
(first dismissal, holding that plaintiff not entitled to bring a de novo action after arbitra-
tion bars second suit in same court following same arbitration); cf. Abbeville Elec. Light
& Power Co. v. Western Elec. Supply Co., 66 S.C. 328, 44 S.E. 952 (1902), writ of error
dismissed, 197 U.S. 299 (1905), and may conclude as well any other issue actually litigated
and ruled upon in the dismissing opinion. See Cooper Agency v. McLeod, 247 F. Supp.
57 (D.S.C. 1965); cf. RESTATEMENT (1), supra note 4, at § 48.1(1)(a) (voluntary nonsuit
without prejudice does not bar second suit).
62. Ellison v. Mattison, 112 S.C. 183, 98 S.E. 840 (1918); Timmons v. Turner, 55 S.C.
490, 33 S.E. 571 (1899); cf. RSTATEMENT (1), supra note 4, at § 48.1(2) (voluntary nonsuit
without prejudice does not bar second suit).
63. Thackston v. Shelton, 178 S.C. 240, 244-45, 182 S.E. 436, 438 (1935). See also
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or for insufficient allegations to sustain the cause of action64 do
not provide the basis for a plea of res judicata. When, however,
the dismissal is involuntary and subsequent to the presentation
and consideration of evidence, the question of its res judicata
effect is less clear.
The court in Morrow v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line
Railway65 set out the following distinction, dependent upon the
reason for the nonsuit:
A nonsuit is not usually a judgment upon the merits. It was
originally given against the plaintiff when he introduced insuffi-
cient evidence to support a verdict, or when he refused or neg-
lected to proceed to the trial of the cause, after it had been put
at issue. It is different, however, where the plaintiff is nonsuited
* . ' because the evidence introduced by the plaintiff proves
affirmatively as a matter of law that he is not entitled to recover.
The difference is that in one instance the plaintiff fails to make
out his case; in the other instance he proves affirmatively facts
which as a matter of law show that he is not entitled to recover.
66
The courts have consistently barred a plaintiff from relitigating
a claim he has once proved invalid."7 They have, however, also
barred the relitigation of a claim which failed once for a lack
rather than a surfeit of evidence.68 These latter decisions compare
two groups of cases, those in which no evidence has been adduced
to support an allegation (in which the decision is not on the
merits) with those in which the evidence adduced is insufficient
to support a verdict and the consequent judgment does bar reliti-
McCrary v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 110 F. Supp. 545 (W.D.S.C. 1953) (dis-
missal of Georgia suit for failure to join an indispensable party does not bar a suit in South
Carolina on the same claim, nor, because of the procedural nature of the rule involved,
does it prevent that suit from proceeding absent the third party).
64. Hodge v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 90 S.C. 229, 232, 71 S.E. 1009, 1010,
rehearing denied, 90 S.C. 249, 73 S.E. 71 (1911); cf. Bell v. Boyd, 252 S.C. 289, 166 S.E.2d
104 (1969). The first dismissal does, of course, conclude the question of the sufficiency of
the allegations. See Antrum v. Hartsville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 228 S.C. 201, 89 S.E.2d 376
(1955) (in responding to an order to show cause why he should not be forced to vacate
property, Antrum argued that foreclosure sale to his predecessor in title was faulty. The
return was held insufficient and could not be used later to support an independent claim).
65. 84 S.C. 224, 66 S.E. 186 (1909).
66. Id. at 242, 66 S.E. at 192.
67. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Kolb, 112 S.C. 1, 6, 99 S.E. 356, 357 (1918); Hodge v.
Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 90 S.C. 229, 71 S.E. 1009 (1911).
68. Winthrop v. Mullins, 211 S.C. 351, 356, 45 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1947); Smith v.
Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 201 S.C. 291, 22 S.E.2d 885 (1942).
[Vol. 28
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gation of the claim. 9 The differing results may be justified by an
analogy in the first instance to a voluntary nonsuit and in the
second to the definition of the scope of a cause of action in the
context of res judicata. If no evidence is presented, no issue is
decided; new or additional evidence, however, cannot construct
a second cause of action.70 If the language in the Morrow opinion
referring to insufficiency of evidence extends to include in this
first group cases where evidence is introduced which supports a
separate cause of action while failing to support the cause pled
and also to recognize the continuing ability of the plaintiff to
pursue in a second suit his appropriate remedy,1 then case law
has constructed a viable definition of judgments on the merits.
72
The definition is, unfortunately, also an extremely complex one.
73
C. Persons Affected by Res Judicata
The Hart formulation of South Carolina's res judicata doc-
trine sets out clearly the requirement that the parties must be the
same or their privies in order for a second suit to be barred. This
limitation is universal and relatively uncomplicated on its face.
Questions arise in two contexts: 1) if plaintiff and defendant in
the first action retain their roles in the second but another party
is joined, is the action barred by res judicata; 2) if one of the
named parties in the second suit is different from the party
named in the first suit, is he in privity with the first litigant and
69. See McCown v. Muldrow, 91 S.C. 523, 539-40, 74 S.E. 386, 391-92 (1912).
70. See notes 12-15 and accompanying text supra.
71. Lancaster v. Smithco, Inc., 241 S.C. 451, 455-56, 128 S.E.2d 915, 919 (1962)
(evidence of violation of warranty insufficient to support an allegation of intent to deceive;
second suit for breach of warranty not barred); Wood v. Champion Paper & Fibre Co.,
157 F. Supp. 393, 394 (W.D.S.C. 1957) (evidence of constructive possession insufficient
to support trespass quare clausum fregit; second suit for trespass to try title not barred).
72. But see Gary v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 249 S.C. 101, 105, 152 S.E.2d 689, 691
(1967), in which the court, justifying its grant of a voluntary nonsuit despite the defen-
dant's claim of prejudice, stated that the result would have been the same had the
defendant's earlier request for an involuntary nonsuit been granted. The plaintiff had
introduced evidence prior to the defendant's motion; when his rebuttal evidence was
denied, he requested and was granted a voluntary nonsuit. "The law is well established
in this jurisdiction that the granting of an involuntary nonsuit for insufficiency of evidence
is not a decision on the merits, and is not res judicata. Had appellant's motion been
granted, the plaintiff could have brought the action again." Id. at 105, 152 S.E.2d at 691
(emphasis added).
73. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b), which states that all dismissals, other than those for
lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join an indispensable party shall be
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hence bound by the judgment. The first determination is made
with reference to the scope of the initial cause of action;74 it is the
second which is the concern of this section.
The most obvious kind of privity which will bind those not
named in the first suit is that which exists between predecessor
and successor to title in real property. Manifold decisions hold (or
assume) the judgments concerning the property rendered for or
against the owner bind those who claim their title through him. 75
Equally well established is the privity relationship which
exists between members of a proper class action.76 If the named
plaintiff and the class are once defeated on the merits of the
claim, that claim may not be given new life if brought by another
named plaintiff on behalf of the same class.7 Alternately, it is
clear that no privity in this context exists between an employer
and employee so as to bind one by a judgment rendered against
the other.78
In other contexts, when the fact situation presented is not as
common, the courts have consistently defined privity by reference
to the realities of the first litigation." If one party's interest has
been legally represented during prior litigation, he may be bound
by that result in a second suit; absent such representation, the
enforcement of res judicata would contradict due process. 0 For
example, although a guardian's suit on his ward's claim may bar
the ward from subsequent assertion of the same claim,' a child
is not barred from relitigating title to land previously litigated by
his parent when the source of his claim is distinct from that of
the parent." The relationship is such that one may represent the
interest of the other, but unless the interest has in fact been so
74. See section IA supra.
75. See Smith v. Smith, 55 S.C. 507, 33 S.E. 583 (1899); Barnes v. Cunningham, 30
S.C. Eq. (9 Rich. Eq.) 475 (1857); Farmer v. Miller, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 480 (1852); Thomas
v. Geiger, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 528 (1820).
76. Evans v. Creech, 187 S.C. 371, 197 S.E. 365 (1938); Davis v. Town of West
Greenville, 147 S.C. 448, 145 S.E. 193 (1928).
77. Neither, of course, may a class member institute an individual suit for recovery.
Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 64 F.R.D. 415 (D.S.C. 1974).
78. Mackey v. Frazier, 234 S.C. 81, 86-87, 106 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1959); Williams v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 274 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D.S.C. 1974).
79. Tate v. Hunter, 22 S.C. Eq. (3 Strob. Eq.) 136 (1849); Mitchell v. Board of
Trustees, 380 F. Supp. 197, 199 (D.S.C. 1973).
80. Heaton v. Southern Ry., 119 F. Supp. 658, 660-61 (W.D.S.C. 1954).
81. First Nat'l Bank of Greenville v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 207 S.C.
15, 35 S.E.2d 47 (1945).
82. Wilkins v. Mulkey, 252 S.C. 615, 167 S.E.2d 619 (1969).
[Vol. 28
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represented, res judicata presents no bar. Similarly, while pre-
vious litigation between one creditor and his debtor will not bind
another creditor,8 3 it may well bind another debtor of the same
creditor.8 The identity of interest is again controlling, as it is in
cases involving assignees.85 The continuing concern to guarantee
each party his day in court is here well-defined and well-reasoned
and supports the decisions which limit the impact of res judicata.
II. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A determination that a second suit rests upon a different
cause of action than did the first eliminates the possibility of
barring the suit in its entirety: res judicata is inapplicable. None-
theless, South Carolina does recognize that parties may still be
prevented from relitigating specific issues of fact in the second
suit if such issues were previously decided in litigation. This oper-
ation of collateral estoppel, termed res judicata by the state
courts,8 6 follows the tripartite formulation of Hart v. Bates:7 if the
parties and subject matter of the two suits are identical, a precise
point ruled on in the first case may not be relitigated.8 While the
binding effect of the first decision may well determine the out-
come of the second suit, it is imperative to distinguish this practi-
cal result of the application of collateral estoppel from the total
bar created by res judicata.89
83. First Nat'l Bank of Florence v. Edwards, 134 S.C. 348, 132 S.E. 824 (1926).
84. Campbell v. Briggs, 25 S.C. Eq. (4 Rich. Eq.) 370 (1852).
85. Compare Brown v. New York Life Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp. 82 (W.D.S.C. 1938), revLd
on other grounds, 99 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 638 (1938) (assignee
bound by prior litigation of assignor) with Hart v. Bates, 17 S.C. 35 (1882) (assignee
claiming title from different source not bound by prior litigation of assignor).
86. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. See also Birnbaum v. Hall, 101 F. Supp.
605, 606 (E.D.S.C. 1951), in which the court, citing South Carolina authority, sets out the
distinction in local case law and identifies the operation of a prior judgment in a second
suit on a separate cause of action as collateral estoppel.
87. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
88. Bell v. Boyd, 252 S.C. 289, 293, 166 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1969); Coleman v. Rush, 123
S.C. 236, 239, 116 S.E. 449, 450 (1923).
89. See text accompanying note 4 supra. In Coleman v. Rush, 123 S.C. 236, 116 S.E.
449 (1923), the plaintiff had originally sued A, claiming title to land through his mother;
judgment was rendered for A. In his second suit against those who claimed title through
A for a partition of the land, he was prevented from asserting his own title to the land
and thus effectively prevented from recovery. However, the claim itself was not barred; it
was only unsuccessful. See also Prather v. Owens, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 236 (1840) (first suit
for damages for obstruction of easement prevents relitigation of plaintiff's right to the
easement in second suit for further damages).
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A. Issues Affected by Collateral Estoppel
South Carolina courts structure their decisions with refer-
ence to three types of identities present in litigation, two of which,
identity of subject matter and of issues, are dealt with in this
section.9" The identity of subject matter necessary to the utiliza-
tion of collateral estoppel is required by the Hart formulation and
is always found when the doctrine is applied. This determination
is never difficult: if the issue raised in two cases is the same, so
too must be the subject matter. The phrase is used to identify the
general concern of the litigation: a contract,9" a piece of prop-
erty,92 a marital relationship.93 In this usage it approaches a trans-
actional definition of the scope of a cause of action94 and should
not be read to imply the need, for example, of a similar theory of
recovery. The requirement becomes confusing when a determina-
tion is made that the issue raised in the second suit is not identi-
cal 'to that raised in the first; the statement of this decision is
frequently couched in terms of the dissimilarity of subject mat-
ter.9" It could as easily refer only to the distinction between the
issues. Since the term causes additional confusion in other con-
texts 9 as well, it would be desirable to abandon it.
The identity of issues which permits a party to preclude reli-
tigation involves a question of fact9" and is best understood by
reference to specific situations.9" For example, a decision that an
90. See section IIB for a discussion of the requirements of the doctrine with respect
to identity of parties.
91. Hines v. Farr, 235 S.C. 436, 442, 112 S.E.2d 33, 36 (1960); Willoughby v. North
Eastern R.R., 52 S.C. 166, 172, 29 S.E. 629, 632 (1898).
92. Newell v. Neal, 50 S.C. 68, 27 S.E. 560 (1897).
93. Murphy v. Brown, 262 S.C. 513, 205 S.E.2d 839 (1974).
94. See notes 32-38 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 104-110 and accompanying text infra.
96. See notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text supra.
97. The courts of South Carolina do not utilize the doctrine of collateral estoppel to
preclude relitigation of issues of law once determined between two parties. Compare this
view with RESTATEMENT (1), supra note 4, at § 68.1(b).
98. The only formal test delineated with respect to such identity in South Carolina
is found in Cooper Agency v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 948, 952-53 (D.S.C. 1971), in
which the court stated that if the same evidence would sustain both issues, the issues are
identical. Cf. notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra. The opinion is confusing, how-
ever, as it speaks in terms first of issues (here misrepresentation), then of actions, and
finally again of issues. Assuming the decision to have been perceived by the court as one
involving collateral estoppel, the enunciated test, while yielding accurate results, seems
unnecessary. Since it also inferentially supports one definition of the scope of a cause of
action in the context of res judicata, it is confusing as well. The apparent decision of the
state courts to answer the question of identity pragmatically is wise.
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insurance company is liable on a policy for payments to the in-
sured because of a covered disability prevents relitigation of the
issue of liability in a second suit for after-acquired premiums;9 a
decision that the defendant was negligent in a suit for personal
injuries prevents relitigation of the issue of negligence in a second
suit for property damages, which would be permitted under the
facts of the case;' 0 a decision that a wife left her husband for good
cause in her suit against him for support prevents relitigation of
the issue in his suit for divorce based on her desertion;'' and a
decision that a divorce decree was invalid in a suit by a husband
pursuant to that decree to require his wife to vacate their house
prevents relitigation of the validity of the divorce in the wife's suit
against her husband's estate for dower rights.' 2 In each of these
instances, the fact which a party was collateraly estopped from
relitigating was an element of both the first and the second
claims,' 3 although such a relationship between the fact and the
99. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cannon, 211 S.C. 134, 44 S.E.2d 25 (1947). It
should be noted that the causes of action presented in each suit, as in all of the following
examples, are distinct. Therefore, the company may dispute the continuance of the disa-
bility even though the first action held it to be permanent. That finding shifts the burden
of proof as to a change in the insured's condition to the insurer but does not preclude the
issue from being raised.
100. Jones v. Hamm, 253 S.C. 283, 170 S.E.2d 206 (1969). Although ordinarily the
plaintiff would have only one cause of action for both personal and property damages,
Holcombe v. Garland & Denwiddie, Inc., 162 S.C. 379, 160 S.E. 881 (1931), and would be
barred by res judicata from maintaining the second suit, the order of the first court here
included a statement that "[tihe findings and conclusions . . . are without prejudice to
the right to pursue for property damages in any proper forum," 253 S.C. at 284, 170 S.E.2d
at 206, and the plaintiff's right to maintain the second suit was neither challenged nor
decided.
101. Powell v. Powell, 249 S.C. 663, 156 S.E.2d 305 (1967).
102. Murphy v. Brown, 262 S.C. 513, 205 S.E.2d 839 (1974). See also Kirby v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 230 S.C. 11, 94 S.E.2d 21 (1956) (landlord's right of possession established in
his suit to eject the tenant cannot be challenged in the tenant's suit for conspiracy); Earle
v. City of Greenville, 84 S.C. 193, 65 S.E. 1050 (1909); Union Bleachery v. United States,
73 F. Supp. 496 (W.D.S.C. 1947), afl'd 176 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
964 (1950).
In the context of collateral estoppel, provided that the parties involved in each suit
are identical, it is irrelevant that one suit was criminal, the other civil. If the issue raised
in the civil proceeding is identical to one determination in the criminal prosecution,
collateral estoppel may be utilized. See Inman v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 784
(W.D.S.C. 1957). Of course, if the order of suits is reversed, the determination of the issue
in a civil proceeding cannot constitutionally bar its relitigation in a criminal prosecution.
103. Other courts have formalized this factor as a test necessary to the imposition of
collateral estoppel; a distinction is made between mediate (evidentiary) and ultimate
facts, and the doctrine is limited in application to those facts which were ultimate in the
first litigation. See, e.g., King v. Chase, 15 N.H. 9, 41 Am. Dec. 675 (1844). An additional
1977]
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claims was either unnoticed or not commented on by the court
and consequently formed no part of the basis of any of the deci-
sions.
Certain issues which arise between the same parties engaged
in later litigation involving the same subject matter might also
meet this second requirement of preclusion as well, but might
nonetheless not have been raised in the first suit. In a second
distinct cause of action, no party may claim the benefits of collat-
eral estoppel, because the issue sought to be established by the
use of this doctrine was not actually litigated. Examples of this
situation include the issue of title to realty in a second suit, which
realty was mistakenly excluded from a surveyor's plat in an ini-
tial suit for authority to sell the minor plaintiff's interest in the
surveyed realty to the defendant;' ° the issue of a boundary be-
tween plaintiff's and defendant's land in a suit which followed
one to set aside a judicial sale of the defendant's land; 105 a claim
of malicious prosecution subsequent to the plaintiff's victory in a
suit for claim and delivery for his car, which had been taken by
the defendant to enforce a mechanic's lien;"6 the defense of ad-
requirement is sometimes imposed: the fact must be ultimate in the second suit. See
Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944). Of course,
any combination of the above two demands is possible, i.e., a court might allow any fact
mediate in the second litigation to be precluded by collateral estoppel. If South Carolina
were to utilize this terminology, apparently the fact would have had to be ultimate in the
first litigation and perhaps in the second as well.
RESTATEMENT (1), supra note 4, avoids the necessity of differentiating mediate from
ultimate facts by directing the court's attention to the degree of relationship between the
claims (see id., § 68, Introductory Note) and the foreseeability at the time of the initial
action that the issue would arise in a different context. See id. § 68.1(e)(ii). Specifically,
if the parties in the first action recognized the issue as important and if the trier of fact
recognized it as necessary to judgment, relitigation of the issue, whether mediate or
ultimate in either suit, is precluded. See id. § 68, Comment j.
To some extent, South Carolina's demand that the subject matter of the actions be
the same before precluding relitigation of an issue achieves results similar to those sought
by the RESTATEMENT (1). However, the failure of the court to justify specifically the re-
quirement on those grounds, as well as the indefinite nature of the requirement itself,
detract considerably from its potential effectiveness.
104. Smith v. DuRant, 236 S.C. 80, 113 S.E.2d 349 (1960). The court also pointed
out that the first proceeding had not been adversary in nature; whether this would have
prevented utilization of the doctrine in any event in a subsequent, clearly adversarial
proceeding is unclear.
105. Nash v. Gardner, 232 S.C. 215, 101 S.E.2d 283 (1957).
106. Martin v. Keith, 214 S.C. 241, 52 S.E.2d 22 (1949). This case presents a good
example of the court's understanding of subject matter within the context of collateral
estoppel. A definition based strictly on a transactional test would obviously encompass
both suits, yet the court found the subject matter as well as the issue of the second
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verse possession to plaintiff's suit to recover possession following
a suit by the defendant claiming title under a conditional deed
from the plaintiff; ' the issue of a testator's residency in the
probate of her will following a finding as to the testator's mental
capacity and appropriate place of commitment;' 8 the issue of a
predecessor guardian's accountability following a discharge of a
subsequent guardian as to the estate handed her;' 9 and the issue
of the appropriate management of one estate following an adjudi-
cation as to the management of a second estate."' As has already
been mentioned in another context,"' fraud is an issue which is
not identical to the fact which it attacks.1
2
South Carolina recognizes one exception to its rule of collat-
eral estoppel preclusion where there is identity of issues. If in one
case the burden of proof or the presumptions which aid a party
in meeting that burden are different than they are in a second
suit, relitigation of an identical issue is not barred."'
litigation to be different. The former finding was unnecessary as well as confusing, but
apparently the concept of differing issues in different causes of action compels in the mind
of the court a finding of differing subject matter. See notes 10 & 11 and accompanying
text supra. If the concern of the court was caused by the completely distinct nature of
the claims and the issues appropriate to each, it would have been well to state that concern
clearly. As it is, the decision seems to equate subject matter with cause of action, an
approach elsewhere rejected as nonsensical in the context of collateral estoppel.
107. Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S.C. 177, 51 S.E.2d 622 (1949). Neither was litigation as
to adverse possession precluded by a prior demonstration by the defendant of a prima facie
case of such possession as a defense to the plaintiff's attempt to obtain a writ'of assistance
to recover possession. Id. at 189, 51 S.E.2d at 628.
108. Reed v. Lemacks, 207 S.C. 137, 35 S.E.2d 34 (1945).
109. Bagwell v. Hinton, 205 S.C. 377, 32 S.E.2d 147 (1944).
110. Ross v. Beacham, 33 F. Supp. 3 (W.D.S.C. 1940).
111. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
112. See Wold v. Funderburg, 250 S.C. 205, 157 S.E.2d 180 (1967) (a mother suing
for custody of her children may maintain that her signature to the adoption papers was
obtained fraudulently, although a prior judgment had rested on a jury finding that she
had signed the papers); Hart v. Bates, 17 S.C. 35 (1882) (an argument that a deed is
fraudulent is not precluded by a prior judgment resting on that deed).
113. Falconer v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 215 S.C. 321, 54 S.E.2d 904 (1949). In reaching
its decision, the court also mentioned that additional testimony was present in the second
suit concerning the issue. However, if preclusion means anything at all, it must mean that
such considerations are irrelevant. Since the decision is justified on other grounds, it is
possible to ignore this part of the opinion and the court has correctly done so in subsequent
cases. Cf. RESTATEMENT (1), supra note 4, at § 68.1(d).
It is interesting to note that the Falconer court did not rest its holding on the lack of
identity between the parties to the first and second suits. The first suit had been brought
by an injured party against the employer of the deceased employee whose negligence was
found to have caused the accident. The second suit was by the deceased employee's estate
against the employer for damages arising out of the employee's death while employed. See
notes 130-133 and accompanying text infra.
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It must be noted that identity of issues (or even of issues and
subject matter) alone is not sufficient to invoke collateral estop-
pel; according to Hart the issue must have been ruled upon."
4
The general rule of thumb that collateral estoppel does not oper-
ate if the first judgment was based upon the defendant's default
springs from this demand. The South Carolina Supreme Court
has never directly addressed the relationship between default and
collateral estoppel, but its decisions do reflect a logical refusal to
extend the impact of a default judgment to a second and separate
cause of action."5
Finally, in order for an issue once decided to be determined
by collateral estoppel, the decision of the issue must have been
necessary to the first judgment: "[A] gratuitous finding by the
court, unnecessary to the decision which had already been made
and . . .not a basis for the judgment .. .could not form the
basis of an estoppel.""' However, two decisions in the state con-
tradict this requirement. In one, the court collaterally estopped
a plaintiff from litigating the concessions which had been made
by his opponent in compromise negotiations. This estoppel was
114. For examples of cases which specifically include this requirement in their hold-
ings, see Lowe v. Clayton, 264 S.C. 75, 212 S.E.2d 582 (1975); Surety Realty Corp. v.
Asmer, 249 S.C. 114, 153 S.E.2d 125 (1967); Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S.C. 177, 51 S.E.2d 622
(1949); Bagwell v. Hinton, 205 S.C. 377, 32 S.E.2d 147 (1944); Brown v. Huskamp, 141
S.C. 121, 139 S.E. 181 (1927); and Willoughby v. North Eastern R.R., 52 S.C. 166, 29 S.E.
629 (1898). It is perhaps most clearly shown in two cases involving a prior judgment
against two co-defendants. In the subsequent suits by one defendant against the other,
since the issues involved as between them had never been ruled on, collateral estoppel was
inapposite. Branton v. Martin, 243 S.C. 90, 132 S.E.2d 285 (1963); Kinard v. Polk, 241
S.C. 555, 129 S.E.2d 527 (1963). It is interesting that the Kinard court considered the case
to be of first impression.
115. See Horton v. Horton, 214 S.C. 141, 51 S.E.2d 425 (1949). Melton v. Melton, 229
S.C. 85, 91 S.E.2d 873 (1956) does, however, demonstrate the kind of confusion caused in
this limited context by the state's failure to distinguish clearly res judicata from collateral
estoppel. Couched in collateral estoppel language ("issues actually litigated", id. at 90,
91 S.E.2d at 875), the decision prevents relitigation of the validity of a marriage and
separation agreement because of a default judgment for unpaid installments under that
agreement. Further explanation by the court does indicate that the subsequent litigation
in its entirety was barred by res judicata, as a contention which should have but was not
previously raised as a defense. The result is thus consistent with other decisions.
116. Lowe v. Clayton, 264 S.C. 75, 85, 212 S.E.2d 582, 587 (1975). Compare
RESTATEMENT (1), supra note 4, at § 68, Comment h. This rule is generally known as the
first of three corollaries to the rule of collateral estoppel. The two remaining, that if a
judgment is based on two independently sufficient determinations, neither issue may be
relitigated (contra, RESTATEMENT (1), § 68, Comment 1), and that if a judgment might have
been based on one or two grounds but the ground used is unknown, either issue may be
relitigated, find neither support nor denial in South Carolina case law.
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based on a prior judgment which, while the case admittedly in-
volved those same concessions and commented on them ad-
versely, was rendered for lack of jurisdiction.1 '7 In the other, the
court conceded a limited collateral estoppel effect to a judgment
based on the passage of the applicable statute of limitations.' 8
Neither decision is justified, and neither has been or should be
followed in determining the applicability of collateral estoppel.
B. Parties Affected by Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel, according to Hart, will not be invoked to
preclude relitigation of an issue unless the parties to the two
litigations are the same or their privies. To a large degree the
courts have rendered decisions on this requirement which parallel
those within the res judicata context."9 Thus, for example, gen-
eral property rules regarding privity are applicable: an estate and
its heirs are bound by prior judgments affecting the testator' 2
provided that their claim is traceable to him.' 2' The same reluct-
ance to expand the concept of privity also operates here as it does
in res judicata holdings. 2 2 The South Carolina courts have conse-
quently refused to allow a judgment rendered in favor of the
117. Cooper Agency v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 948, 952-53 (D.S.C. 1971). The
decision could be read as one concerned with res judicata, in which case difficulties arise
because of its cavalier treatment of the requirement that such judgments be rendered on
the merits. See notes 58-73 and accompanying text supra. It is to this issue that the court
addresses itself, apparently recognizing but not rectifying the problem. However, the
opinion rests on a determination of the identity of issues, never mentioning any identity
of causes of action; it reads as a collateral estoppel holding.
118. Lyerly v. Yeadon, 199 S.C. 363, 19 S.E.2d 648 (1942). Admittedly the court, in
recognizing a limited preclusion, denied the greater preclusionary effect requested.
119. See notes 75-85 and accompanying text supra.
120. See, e.g., Murphy v. Brown, 262 S.C. 513, 516, 205 S.E.2d 839, 840 (1974) (in a
widow's suit against the executors and devisees of her husband's estate for dower, a prior
judgment that the divorce procured by the husband was null and void precluded a defense
based upon that divorce).
121. Wilkins v. Mulkey, 252 S.C. 615, 167 S.E.2d 619 (1969) (grandchildren claiming
land under the remainder clause of grandmother's will not bound by an adjudication as
to the ownership of the land which involved their parents, since their claim of title was
not through those parents).
122. It should be noted, however, that a finding of no privity, while it disposes of an
argument that all litigation as to an issue should be barred, does not necessarily prevent
the use of a prior judgment as evidence. See Koogler v. Huffman, 12 S.C.L. (1 McC.) 495
(1821) (prior judgment that X acted as agent for Y and that consequently title to realty
was in Y admissible as evidence of the plaintiff's claim of title through Y). Such usage, of
course, is subject to the state's rules of evidence. See generally W. REISER, A COMPARISON
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EviDENcE wrrH SOUTH CAROLINA EvDENCE LAw (1976).
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defendant in a suit by plaintiff as administrator for wrongful
death to preclude litigation of the same issues in a second suit by
the plaintiff as beneficiary under a survival statute.' 23 A declara-
tory judgment that an insurer is not liable to an insured for dam-
ages arising from an accident will not prevent relitigation of its
liability in a suit by the injured party,' 2 nor will an adoption
controversy litigated by the natural mother prevent relitigation
of the validity of that adoption involving the natural father.'2
Finally, litigation between an employer and a party will not pre-
vent relitigation of the same issue between the employee and the
party.'
26
When originally formulated, the South Carolina requirement
of identity of parties or their privies reflected a traditional and
well-entrenched limitation on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The inevitable corollary resulting from this demand for identity
of parties was the requirement for so-called mutuality of estoppel,
i.e., unless a prior determination of fact concludes both parties
to a subsequent litigation, it concludes neither.2 7 However, dur-
ing the past thirty years the requirement of mutuality has been
abandoned in jurisdiction after jurisdiction. 121 Provided that the
party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or
in privity with a party to the initial litigation in which an issue
was raised and determined adversely to him, the doctrine will
prevent relitigation of the identical issue even though the party
utilizing the doctrine was not involved in the first suit.2 9 No
123. Peeples v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 115 S.C. 115, 104 S.E. 541 (1920). The court
based its decision on the separate nature of the causes of action, which would prevent
application of the doctrine of res judicata, but also said that "[i]t follows that all efforts
made to go into the record of the former trial must fail." Id. at 118, 104 S.E. at 542. The
assertion again demonstrates the confusion between res judicata and collateral estoppel.
In the latter context, however, the decision is in accord with other cases distinguishing
parties by reference to their capacities. Gleaton v. Southern Ry., 212 S.C. 186, 46 S.E.2d
879 (1948); Deaton v. Gay Trucking Co., 275 F. Supp. 750 (D.S.C. 1967). See also note 26
and accompanying text supra.
124. Pharr v. Canal Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 266, 104 S.E.2d 394 (1958); Bailey v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 S.C. 169, 193 S.E. 638 (1937).
125. Wold v. Funderburg, 250 S.C. 205, 157 S.E.2d 180 (1967).
126. Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 274 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C. 1967).
127. Birnbaum v. Hall, 101 F. Supp. 605, 608 (E.D.S.C. 1951). See also Mack Mfg.
Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 114 S.C. 207, 103 S.E. 499 (1920); Continental
Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 106 S.C. 43, 90 S.E. 318 (1916).
128. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942). See RESTATEMENT (2), supra note 4, at § 88 and the Reporter's Note thereto.
129. Tully v. Pate, 372 F. Supp. 1064 (D.S.C. 1973). This case is a good, if unique,
example of the broadening result achieved by abandonment of the mutuality requirement.
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longer is the stranger denied the benefits of preclusion simply
because no such preclusion may operate against him.
The courts of this state, however, have failed to follow this
modem trend and continue to require, with one exception, com-
plete identity of parties or their privies before barring relitigation
of an issue once determined.'30 In 1959, the court did recognize a
single situation in which a party would be estopped absent mu-
tuality.'3 ' The owner of a vehicle brought suit against the driver
of a second vehicle as a result of an accident, alleging damages
caused by the defendant's negligence, and the defendant counter-
claimed alleging that the accident was caused by the negligence
of the plaintiff's employee who was driving the other vehicle.
Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff and was held to bar
relitigation as to the facts of the accident (and hence to support
a judgment on the pleadings) in the defendant's subsequent suit
against the employee. The court rested its decision on grounds of
public policy,'32 seeing it as a situation not covered by the Hart
formulation which should nonetheless be subject to that holding's
bar. 33 The case clearly is encompassed by the more general aban-
Although the case was decided by a South Carolina federal court, it must be noted that
the governing law, and hence the collateral estoppel definition, was found under the facts
to be that of Georgia.
In those jurisdictions which do recognize the expanded role of collateral estoppel, it
is always necessary that the party against whom the bar is asserted have been a party to
the former litigation. Such decisions as Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 274 F. Supp.
216 (D.S.C. 1967), and Heaton v. Southern Ry., 119 F. Supp. 658 (W.D.S.C. 1954), would
thus remain unaffected by the expansion.
130. Birnbaum v. Hall, 101 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
131. Mackey v. Frazier, 234 S.C. 81, 106 S.E.2d 895 (1959).
132. Id. at 88, 106 S.E.2d at 899.
133. Much earlier, the court had reached a similar conclusion in an analogous situa-
tion involving the relationship between a lessee and lessor. Jenkins v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 89 S.C. 408, 71 S.E. 1010 (1911). Suing for injuries allegedly caused by the lessee's
negligence, the plaintiff lost and was prevented from relitigating issues determined in that
case in his second suit against the lessor:
[Tihe true ground upon which a former judgment, in a case like this, should
be allowed to operate as a bar to a second action is not resjudicata, or technical
[collateral?] estoppel, because the parties are not the same, and there is no
privity between them as is necessary for the application of that doctrine; but
that in such cases, on grounds of public policy, the principle of estoppel should
be expanded, so as to embrace within the estoppel of a judgment, persons who
are not, strictly speaking, either parties or privies. It is rested upon the whole-
some principle which allows every litigant one opportunity to try his case on the
merits, but limits him, in the interest of the public, to one such opportunity.
Id. at 412, 71 S.E. at 1012. [The case, without mentioning the fact, overrules contrary
earlier decisions, such as Logan v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line R.R., 82 S.C. 518, 64 S.E.
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donment of the mutuality doctrine noted above. It has not, how-
ever, been the signal for such abandonment in any other context
in the state.
CONCLUSION
The courts of South Carolina for nearly one hundred years
have precluded relitigation of either entire suits or issues on the
basis of three tests: the identity of subject matter, the identity of
parties, and the identity of issues or causes of action. It is only
with respect to the third concern that any distinction between res
judicata and collateral estoppel is made, and even within that
context many cases confuse the two doctrines in language if not
in result.
The demand that the subject matter of two litigations must
be the same before relitigation is barred should be adandoned. In
res judicata cases it adds nothing to the requirement that the
causes of action be identical and may well hinder any attempts
by the courts to broaden the defined scope of the latter. Cases
indicate that the concepts are distinct, yet a transactional defini-
tion of one inevitably approaches any rational definition of the
other. In collateral estoppel cases, the demand as it is utilized
adds nothing to the requirement that the issues be identical and
may well hinder any attempts by the courts to formulate an addi-
tion to the doctrine, i.e., that the initial determination of the
issue be understood by the parties and the court to be important
and necessary to the first judgment:.
While the complete identity of parties or their privies is ob-
viously essential if a person is to be precluded by the operation
of res judicata, it is not essential in the context of collateral estop-
pel. To bar a party from relitigating an issue once decided against
him, even though his current adversary was a stranger to that
decision, well accords with the policies underlying the doctrine,
works no unfairness on the affected party, and has been widely
accepted as an appropriate expansion of the doctrine. In addition
to such reasons for abandoning the mutuality requirement, a
practical advantage with broader impact would result. It would
be necessary to redefine the Hart holding and to distinguish res
judicata from collateral estoppel in a more dramatic fashion than
515 (1909).] The quoted rationale is now used as the basis for a general refusal to require
mutuality; it has not called forth that result in its state of origin.
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that undertaken to date. In that process, it is at least possible
that the court would also consider dropping reference to subject
matter and setting out clearly its current concept of the scope of
a cause of action.
The identity of issues within the context of collateral estop-
pel is as necessary as is the identity of parties within the context
of res judicata, and for the most part case law has dealt accur-
ately with questions arising under this requirement. The judici-
ary has not, however, sufficiently considered subsidiary require-
ments generally recognized as essential prerequisites to the pre-
clusion of relitigation and has even occasionally indicated that
the initial determination of an issue need not have been necessary
to the judgment. Particularly if mutuality of estoppel is fore-
saken, the court must graft onto a new test considerations of the
role of the issue in the first litigation and the perception of its
importance by the parties and the court.
Numerous decisions reflect the necessity of identity between
causes of action before a party is barred by res judicata. Less clear
than this necessity is the definition of the scope of one cause of
action, but there are indications that some transactional concept
may be appropriate. To force a litigant to deal in one suit with
all claims arising out of a related set of facts or to lose all claims
not so litigated best serves not only the policies of res judicata but
those of convenience, expediency and complete justice between
the parties. If combined with a clearly stated and parallel com-
pulsory counterclaim rule, it also avoids the now rampant confu-
sion concerning defenses which are the equivalent of claims and
the results of their use or nonuse by the defendant. To the extent
that other rules of procedure, such as those limiting joinder or
forcing the election of a single remedy, conflict with the effect of
such a definition, exceptions to that definition may be recog-
nized.
34
134. Of course, it is also possible to avoid such conflict by changing or dropping the
other procedural rules. In particular, the doctrine of election of remedies was created
originally to serve two purposes: to prevent relitigation of issues once determined and to
ensure truthfulness in pleading. The first is accomplished by res judicata and collateral
estoppel, the second by an understanding of the attorney's ethical obligations (see FED.
R. Civ. P. 11) and an awareness that alternative and inconsistent allegations are not
necessarily indicative of untruth. The plaintiff may either not be in a position to know
which set of facts is true or, more frequently, not be able to determine which of two
possible interpretations he will be able to prove (for example, fraud or breach of contract).
To deny him the opportunity to present all of his arguments is unreasonable as well as
1977]
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Finally, the courts of the state have long held that, in the
context of res judicata, the three identities are insufficient unless
the first judgment was on the merits. The requirement is ac-
cepted, but the South Carolina decisions on point which involve
the effect of an involuntary nonsuit are confusing. The relation-
ship between res judicata and election of remedies is here at its
most pernicious. At the least it is necessary for each judgment
nonsuiting a plaintiff to indicate whether that judgment is ren-
dered on the merits and to create a general assumption that,
absent a contrary indication, a judgment was on the merits.
For the most, the suggestions and recommendations above
are supported by existing case law. A restatement by the court
of what it has actually done in the past, rather than a mechanical
reiteration of an old formula, would do much to clarify the doc-
trines and their areas of application. A reevaluation by the court
of the purposes underlying those doctrines might well lead to
substantive and necessary change. And a reexamination by the
court of the impact on the doctrines of other procedural rules in
the state could result in the beginnings of a system designed to
serve the modern needs of its participants.
unnecessary and may prevent the court from accomplishing total justice between the
parties. See Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818 (1952). See
also H. LiatrsEy, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA CODE PLEADING 240-43 (1976).
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